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Abstract: The author of this article explores the issues of the Proponents of Euroscep-
ticism in the UK from 1950 to 2017. The researcher claims that Winston Churchill 
was the first Eurosceptic Prime Minister. The author believes that Euroscepticism is 
not related to any political party, but is a non-party phenomenon, not linked to a par-
ticular ideology. However, the researcher concludes that the biggest number of Euro-
sceptics in the UK can be found among the Conservatives. In addition, in his study, 
the author identifies the main theorist of contemporary British Euroscepticism as well 
as the moderate and radical types of Euroscepticism.
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The idea of a united Europe gained special significance and was ac-tively discussed in the academic and political circles of Europe after 
the Second World War. In spite of enthusiasts, this idea also attracted 
sceptics and opponents. The British were the most sceptical politicians 
regarding European integration processes. Therefore, the aim of this arti-
cle is to identify the adherents of Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom 
between 1950 and 2017 and to study the ideological foundations of their 
Eurosceptic positions. The main methods applied in this study are histori-
cal and comparative methods as well as analysis. The author investigates 
the problem taking into consideration the positions of the leaders of the 
government, ruling parties and opposition in the UK, so an institutional 
approach is fundamental in this study.
In the postwar era in the UK, Winston Churchill (UK Prime Minister, 
1940–1945 and 1951–1955) was one of the main inspirers of the creation 
of a “United States of Europe” (Heywood, 2003, p. 131). However, de-
spite his calls for the creation of a united Europe, he demonstrated moder-
ate Euroscepticism, in particular concerning Britain’s participation in this 
process. He, as well as French leader Charles de Gaulle, believed Britain 
to be too far from Europe, not only geographically but also mentally. Once, 
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Churchill argued with de Gaulle, saying that Britain would always choose 
the sea, when the need arose to choose between Europe and the open sea 
(Johnson, 2015, p. 229). Paradoxically, on the one hand, Churchill was 
sceptical about European integration, and on the other hand, he was a sup-
porter of it and advocated the formation of a united Europe. The role of 
Great Britain in this process was seen by him as a guarantor or a witness, 
but not directly as a member or a participant: we are with Europe, but we 
are not Europe (Johnson, 2015, p. 229).
Churchill was “euroenthusiastic” as was Labour (Watts, Pilkington, 
2005, pp. 17–24). However, he did not initiate the filing of an application 
of the United Kingdom for joining the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (ECSC) established in 1951, when he was Prime Minister of UK 
from 1951–1955. Obviously, he had some doubts as to the expediency of 
Britain’s participation in the unification, and sceptical about the further 
need for Britain to join it. Britain “wanted to look like an important part 
of Europe, but without joining it” (Watts, Pilkington, 2005, pp. 17–24). 
Consequently, Churchill can be considered as a Eurosceptic who did not 
want Britain to become part of Europe, but in every way supported the 
processes of European integration without the involvement of the UK.
Despite the fact that the Eurosceptic Churchill was a conservative, 
his attitude to a united Europe was shared by members of the Labour 
Party. France invited the United Kingdom to join the negotiations with 
Germany, Italy and Benelux to establish a supranational association that 
would manage the common European markets of coal and steel at the 
dawn of the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950. 
It was supposed that the ECSC would be the supreme governing body 
– the germ of the European Commission. It was also planned to create an 
assembly of national parliamentarians and a council of national ministers 
– a prototype of the European Parliament and the Council of the EU re-
spectively, as well as establish a judicial body, the forerunner of the Euro-
pean Court. Thus, Britain was asked to contribute to the very birth of the 
European Union. But then Prime Minister and leader of the Labour Party, 
Clement Attlee (premier, 1945–1951; party leader, 1935–1955), opposed 
Britain’s engagement in the establishment of the ECSC.
Despite the scepticism of Attlee, the Foreign Minister, Labour MP 
Ernest Bevin, who had the right and duty to represent the UK at such 
congresses, was positively inclined to cooperate with European countries, 
so it was probable that Britain would join the creation of a united Europe 
(Pedler, 2015, pp. 55–61). But, Bevin, due to illness, had to resign liter-
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ally a month before the conclusion of the Paris Treaty, on April 14, 1951. 
Then, the Eurosceptic Attlee appointed Herbert Morrison as Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, who was also against his country’s participation in the 
European integration processes. Together with Attlee, they refused to par-
ticipate in the Paris Conference 1951, and the reason for that was that 
Britain was still the largest producer of coal and steel in Europe, so there 
was no need felt in Britain for that union.
The situation was perfect for the Eurosceptic Labour Party then. It is 
unclear whether Bevin really fell ill, or whether it was a well-thought-out 
action by the radical Eurosceptic Attlee. Besides, the so-called sick con-
dition of the key minister on this issue was probably not the main factor 
that influenced the refusal to participate in the creation of the ECSC. The 
factor was the desire of the British to maintain economic independence 
and, more importantly, insufficient understanding of the significance of 
the new organization (Gabel, 2016).
It is also the case that ideological factors had an influence on their 
anti-ECSC position. To be more precise, Attlee and Morrison were British 
left-wing nationalists, which bordered upon socialism (Bew, 2016). They 
advocated the nationalization of key industries and utilities and the crea-
tion of a welfare state (Jenkins, 2011). According to Canadian historian 
David Churchill, left-wing nationalists are the opponents of any empires 
(Churchill, 2012, pp. 227–260). This is said to be the reason why Attlee 
and Morrison opposed the accession of Britain to the ECSC, which, in 
their view, was a potential imperial threat. Morrison, for example, was 
convinced that if Britain joined the ECSC, it would mean the end of Brit-
ain as an independent state (Churchill, 2012, pp. 227–260). At the same 
time, Attlee’s aversion to empires is also confirmed by the fact that he was 
one of Britain’s first Prime Ministers who promoted the idea of giving in-
dependence to India. Hence, we can call him the curator of the beginning 
of the dismantling of the British Empire.
Regardless of the UK’s negative response, the European integration 
process successfully moved forward. The second stage of the formation 
of the common market began in 1955. At that time, the Prime Minis-
ter of Great Britain was the Conservative Anthony Eden (Prime Minis-
ter, 1955–1957), who was a bigger Eurosceptic than his party colleague 
Churchill. Without doubt, this adversely affected further communication 
between the UK and the ECSC. The Eurosceptic Eden rejected the pro-
posal when Britain again received an invitation from the ECSC to join 
the community in 1955. He, as well as his political opponents, believed 
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that the ECSC would turn into a supra-state entity, therefore, according to 
him, it would be better for Britain to avoid such an opportunity (Forster, 
2002, pp. 19–20).
Labour MP Hugh Gaitskell was firmly convinced of this position, too. 
He was elected to the British Parliament from the Labour Party in 1945. 
He headed the British Ministry of Fuel and Energy between 1947 and 
1950 and then the Ministry of Finance from 1950–1951. As a Minister of 
Finance, Gaitskell claimed that joining a united Europe could mean the 
end of the UK as an independent state, which, in his opinion, would mean 
the end of a thousand years of history (Nechaiuk, 2013, p. 31). He noted 
that by joining the creation of the ECSC, “Britain will not even be bigger 
than Texas or California in the United States of Europe” (Black, 2015, 
p. 344). As leader of the opposition Labour Party (1955–1963), Gaitskell 
expressed his categorical disagreement about the potential accession of 
Britain to the Common Market, arguing that there were no convincing 
economic benefits (Gaitskell, 1962, pp. 3–23). Obviously, at that time, the 
key criterion of Euroscepticism, in particular for Labour, was the actual 
economic grounds. Gaitskell was convinced that Britain had a much more 
favorable position outside the European Economic Community (EEC) 
than if it were its member.
The United Kingdom did not become a member of the ECSC in the 
1950s because of the excessively pessimistic position of government 
leaders and sometimes even their uncertainty about the unity of Europe. 
Furthermore, Euroscepticism was characteristic not only of Labour and 
the Conservatives, but of these two ideological party camps. Yet claiming 
absolute Euroscepticism of the Conservatives or Labour would be incor-
rect. For example, at the beginning of European integration, Conservative 
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (1957–1963), Labour Harold Wilson 
(1964–1970 and 1974–1976), Conservative Edward Heath (1970–1974) 
and Labour James Callaghan (1976–1979) were all supporters of the par-
ticipation of the UK in the ECSC and EEC.
The Labour Government, led by Callaghan (1976–1979) during the 
crisis period in the mid-1970s was unable to govern the state, and lost 
the 1979 election. He was replaced by a new leader, Margaret Thatcher 
(1979–1990). Before becoming Prime Minister in 1979 and signing the 
Single European Act in 1986, Margaret Thatcher, when she was leader 
of the Conservative party (1975–1979), advocated British membership 
of the EEC, and agitated for that during a referendum in June 1975 (Can-
nadine, 2017, pp. 97–100).
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But over time, the European project disappointed her. The risk of ex-
cessive federalization of a united Europe was the main reason for that 
(Cannadine, 2017, pp. 97–100). For this reason, Thatcher noted in the 
“Sunday Times” that over the past thirty years Britain’s policy had leant 
toward a collectivist society, which was the most annoying fact (Sabov, 
1989, pp. 8–9). The “Iron Lady” was sharply opposed to excessive state 
interference (which did not produce the desired results), bureaucracy, 
cumbersome systems of social services, unification and regimentation 
of social life, the limiting of individual opportunities, etc. (Sabov, 1989, 
pp. 8–9). Taking this into consideration, her radical, Eurosceptic attitude 
towards an excessively bureaucratic and centralized united Europe be-
comes quite clear. Her famous Bruges speech in 1988 greatly changed the 
public discourse on European integration within Britain and became an 
example for a new generation of Eurosceptics.
With the complete rejection of the idea of a United States of Europe, 
Thatcher sharply criticized everybody who favored the trend of European 
integration, largely because of her categorical position about centraliza-
tion in the EU. Thatcher was against the creation of a super-state with 
its center in Brussels. She was not an adversary of European integra-
tion processes and the EEC as a whole, but she negatively referred to 
all threats to the national security and identity of the United Kingdom 
(Cannadine, 2017, pp. 100–111). Those were the increase in the number 
of illegal immigrants, the rise of terrorism and the spread of drugs, which 
would increase even more with the creation of the EU (Thatcher, 1988). 
This is not surprising, because in 1984, having participated in the annual 
party conference in Brighton, she avoided her own death when terrorists 
from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) attacked the hotel where the entire 
leadership of the Tory was staying (Sabov, 1989, p. 11).
At the time many members of the Conservative Party, including her 
ally Norman Tebbit, suffered. In line with these and other issues of na-
tional security in Britain, in 1985, when the Schengen agreement was 
signed, which included the removal of border controls for all member 
countries of the EEC and some non-members, the United Kingdom did 
not join. In the 1980s, Thatcher’s attitude towards European integration 
processes was “antagonistic” then (Sabov, 1989, p. 16).
There were two key themes in Thatcher’s attitude to a united Europe: 
she was a Eurosceptic in the questions of moderate European integration 
processes, but was an anti-European in the question of the creation of 
a supranational united Europe (Wester, 1992, p. 193). Therefore, when the 
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issue of the creation of the European Union arose, she categorically op-
posed it, having claimed that “Maastricht is yesterday’s idea” (Thatcher, 
1992) and having said “no, no, no” to management from Brussels (Kam-
pen, 2013). Thatcher was convinced that the EU project would act against 
British interests and would be a destructive force for British parliamen-
tary democracy (Hughes, 2016).
Eventually, Britain became one of the founders of the European Un-
ion in its present form in February 1992, despite the warnings and fears 
of Thatcher. At that time, Prime Minister of Britain was the leader of the 
Conservative Party, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chancellor of 
the Treasury in the government of Margaret Thatcher, John Major (Prime 
Minister, 1990–1997).
Unlike his predecessor, Major supported the further European integra-
tion of Britain, which he confirmed by signing the Maastricht Treaty on 
the founding of the EU. However, this did not happen without the expres-
sion of moderate scepticism from him. Addressing MPs in the British 
Parliament in 1992, Major stated that by joining the EU, the United King-
dom retained a number of special rights and opportunities, according to 
which their country would not become a hostage to the EU, and that it, in 
turn, would not be transformed into federated Europe, which Major cat-
egorically rejected (Major, 2010, p. 90). Moreover, as the Prime Minister 
stated, he was under pressure from other member states to agree to take 
foreign policy decisions with the principle of a majority vote. He didn’t 
want Britain to accept the decision that do not correspond to its interests. 
This is said to be the reason why he defended the idea of an absolute 
majority (Major, 2010, p. 90). However, despite the attempts by the then 
head of government to justify his decision, he was not supported by his 
Conservative Party, whereas the majority of the Labour Party agreed with 
the decision of Major, which was repeatedly confirmed by the statements 
of its leadership (Bevins, 1993). That is, the opposition, led by Neil Kin-
nock (leader of the Labour Party, 1983–1992), supported the European 
integration intentions of the conservative John Major.
On the contrary, some conservative MPs, the so-called “Maastricht 
rebels,” who didn’t agree with the decision by Major, went on to more 
radical measures and, in May 1992, committed sabotage in the British 
Parliament during the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (Cowley, 2016, 
pp. 9–10). Their number was rather insignificant – 22 persons, but this 
was enough to halt the process of the European integration of Britain 
for a certain time. The most active and persistent among the “Maastricht 
ŚSP 4 ’17 Proponents of Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom... 45
rebels” were Iain Duncan Smith, Barry Legg and Walter Sweeney (Cow-
ley, 2016, p. 7). But the list of opponents of the European integration 
of Britain is not limited by these individuals. Persistent Eurosceptics in-
cluded Peter Lilley, Michael Portillo and Michael Howard. Portillo was 
the most radical and influential among them (Watts, 2005, p. 125). In 
spite of the official policy of the government, Portillo felt extremely free 
in expressing anti-European positions. This is not surprising, since he was 
a fervent follower of Thatcherism, as he himself repeatedly stated (Por-
tillo, 2013).
Anthony Heath believed that the squall of criticism about Major was 
not caused by the fact that he signed the Maastricht Treaty, but by its bad 
content (Heath, 2011, pp. 683–685). In this context, it is worth pointing 
out that, despite his positive opinion of European integration, Major did 
not idealize the Maastricht Treaty and even criticized the so-called “The 
Social Protocol” (or the Social Chapter), according to which “a social-
ist nightmare of regulation and corporativeness” could begin (Williams, 
1993). So, he was not a blind Eurointegrator, but pragmatically evaluated 
the capabilities of Britain as a member of the EU. The head of government, 
along with some Labour party members and Conservatives, feared that if 
Britain joined the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty, unemployment 
would increase significantly, and the closure of many businesses would 
be inevitable, which would have had a tragic effect on the economy of the 
country (Williams, 1993).
However, Major accepted compromises and called for the revision 
of the Treaty’s principles in order to ratify it. On the contrary, part of the 
Conservatives did not accept the Maastricht agreement at all. The rational 
pragmatism of Major’s foreign policy provides reasons to identify him as 
a pedantic Europeanist and, at the same time, a moderate Eurosceptic, who 
wanted the United Kingdom to join the EU, without becoming its victim.
Later, in his memoirs, Major remembered that those “Maastricht 
rebels” had the full support of Thatcher and of one of the leaders of 
the Conservative Party from 1985–1987, Norman Tebbit (Major, 2010, 
pp. 264–271). The latter had ambiguous views on the EU. Once he said: 
“I agree that we do not want to leave the EU, but we must manipulate and 
block all of its solutions that do not meet our needs. A veto on everything 
that the EU does not approve of, or anything we disapprove of” (Wyatt, 
2000, pp. 437–438).
It is obvious that such behavior by any member of the EU would lead 
to a permanent crisis in the functioning of the EU. It is quite clear that 
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Tebbit held the view of Euroscepticism, based on the categorical rejec-
tion of the single currency and potential creation of EU citizenship. But 
interestingly, he did not call for a renunciation of Britain’s membership of 
the EU (Crowson, 2007, pp. 55–60). The British Parliament ratified the 
Maastricht Treaty (Haycock, 1993) without joining the Social Chapter 
(Lourie, 1997, pp. 7–8) on August 3, 1993, despite political obstacles. 
When the question of Britain’s joining the Social Chapter arose again, 
Major did not change his attitude towards it and called it “a Trojan horse” 
at the end of his government term in 1997 (Gilman, 1997).
It is rather interesting that the Conservative party did not have a clear 
position on the European integration of Britain. For instance, Major kept 
the majority on his side, despite having suffered much criticism from his 
party members. The result of the leadership election, when Major an-
nounced his resignation in 1995, is confirmation of this. Then, his oppo-
nent was the conservative, Eurosceptic John Redwood. As a result of the 
election, the latter gained the support of 89 party members, while Major, 
as much as 218. It is obvious that the Eurosceptics of the Conservative 
Party at that time were, as Major said, in the “small minority” (Cowley, 
2016, p. 18).
Redwood’s fiasco, however, did not mean he lost influence on UK 
politics. Quite the contrary, he remained a rather influential Euroscep-
tic not only on the political stage, but also in academic circles and the 
mass media. He categorically opposed the idea of a European superstate 
and a single currency in the EU (Heathcoat-Amory, 2012, pp. 87–88). At 
the end of the 1990s, the politician was convinced that the formation of 
a single currency in the EU would lead to the collapse of Britain (Red-
wood, 1999, pp. 163–173). Redwood can be considered an “archetypal 
conservative Eurosceptic” (Bennet, 2016, pp. 3–5). Indeed, in his books 
Our currency. Our country: the dangers of the European Monetary Union 
(Redwood, 1997), The Death of Britain? (Redwood, 1999) and Just say 
no! 100 Arguments Against the Euro (Redwood, 2001) Redwood actively 
advocated Euroscepticism and appealed to British politicians to oppose 
certain aspects of European integration.
For example, he agitated to reject the “Stability and Growth Pact,” 
which was intended to guarantee the compliance of countries partici-
pating in Economic and Monetary Union with fiscal policies after the 
introduction of a single currency in the EU (Redwood, 1997, p. 207). 
Redwood negatively perceived that fact that EU institutions, in particular 
the European Court, had more power than national authorities (Redwood, 
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1999, p. 28; 78). He was convinced that having given the Court the role 
of interpreting EU treaties made it a supranational body that negatively 
reflected the status of EU member states.
Since the books by Redwood, as well as his own political activities, 
were aimed at criticizing the EU and Britain’s European integration, then 
he should be recognized as one of the theorists of contemporary British 
Euroscepticism. The idea of a single currency in the EU, which he fun-
damentally rejected, was the source of Redwood’s Euroscepticism. He 
was a passionate supporter of the foreign policy style of Thatcher, who 
was also cautious about the super-state ideas of the transformation of the 
EU. This is said to be the reason why Owen Bennett called Redwood “the 
beloved son of Margaret Thatcher” (Bennet, 2016, pp. 5–6).
The 1997 parliamentary elections were catastrophic (Turner, 2000, 
p. 221) for the Conservatives and led them into opposition, as the Labour 
Party, led by Europhile Tony Blair (leader of the party from 1994–2007), 
gained more support. After the resignation of Major, Redwood ran for 
Conservative party leader, but was again defeated, taking third place 
(Heathcoat-Amory, 2012, p. 87). The Eurosceptic and anti-EU William 
Hague become party leader. Redwood considered him weak in confront-
ing the EU, since at that time Hague recognized the possibility of the Euro-
pean Parliament ruling over national democracies, which was against the 
interests of Britain (Baimbridge, Whyman, Mullen, 2016, pp. 94–96).
Nevertheless, Hague should not be identified as a pro-European politi-
cian, but rather as a moderate Eurosceptic. He, like Redwood, was cat-
egorically opposed to the introduction of a single currency in the EU, and 
even tried to oust pro-European Conservatives from the party on several 
occasions. For example, Hague conducted an intra-party survey on the at-
titude of party members to the Euro currency in 1998. The results showed 
that 85% of respondents supported the leader’s policy (Baimbridge, Why-
man, Mullen, 2016, p. 95). According to Hague’s plan, the other 15% 
should have been deprived of the right to run for Parliament from the 
Conservative Party in the future. Then, for pro-European Conservatives, 
a period of isolation began (Turner, 2000, p. 220). One of Hague’s tasks 
was to minimize the influence of those Tories on party politics. Despite 
this, the issue from time to time caused controversy among the Conserva-
tives, but did not lead to radicalism.
In such a manner, Hague became the opposition to the pro-European 
policy of new Prime Minister Tony Blair (1997–2007) and the Labour Party 
in general. In addition to Party motives, Hague’s Euroscepticism was based 
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on his fears of collective taxation in the EU, the convergence of economic 
and security policies, and the potential federative direction of EU develop-
ment (Turner, 2000, p. 221). If the latter had been implemented, then Hague 
would have seen two options for a British response: either the suspension 
of European integration processes (Baimbridge, Whyman, Mullen, 2016, 
p. 94), or exit from the EU in general (MacShane, 2015, p. 108).
Therefore, most Conservatives under the leadership of Hague re-
frained from voting during all three readings when the process of rati-
fication of the Amsterdam Treaty in the British Parliament took place in 
1997. The leader of the Conservative Party believed that European inte-
gration should have its limits, and this, in his opinion, had already been 
achieved in 1997 (Holmes, 1998, pp. 133–140). Under such conditions, 
in his view, the EU was moving in the wrong direction for Britain. This 
position was motivated by the fact that, as Hague noted, the EU had two 
major problems: excessive interference in national affairs and regulation 
of all spheres of life. Instead, according to Hague, EU member states 
should build a free and flexible Europe.
So, his Euroscepticism was based on the fear that the deepening of 
political integration in the EU would lead to a state where accountability 
and democracy would become unmanageable and lose meaning (Holmes, 
1999). Also Hague categorically rejected any option for the formation of 
an EU Army (Baimbridge, Whyman, Mullen, 2016, p. 95).
Hague was a constructive Eurosceptic who offered an alternative to 
what he criticized. He thought that because the British firmly believed 
that Britain’s place was within the European Union, then politicians 
should work to make this Union “correct.” According to his vision, this 
should be a European Union which does less, but does it better, rather 
than “clinging to commissions” of the EU, which challenge democratic 
government (Holmes, 1999). It should be emphasized that even at critical 
moments of its existence, Hague did not agitate for Britain to leave the 
EU. For example, the Conservative leader emphasized that Britain should 
remain in the ranks of the EU, but not accept the Euro as its currency, 
when the issue of the introduction of a single currency in the EU became 
the agenda of European politics (Baimbridge, Whyman, Mullen, 2016, 
p. 94). Hague resigned when the Labour Party again formed the govern-
ment after the parliamentary elections in which the Conservative Party 
received a minority of votes in 2001.
In the same year, Iain Duncan Smith became the Conservative leader 
(2001–2003). He, with the support of the authoritative Thatcher, con-
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tinued the radical Eurosceptic policy of his predecessor. His hostility to 
the EU was the main factor why he won the election (MacShane, 2015, 
p. 111). Despite the fact that Smith was the leader of the opposition only 
briefly, in British politics he is famous as a prominent Eurosceptic. Ac-
cording to Anthony Foster, during the reign of Smith, Euroscepticism be-
came the official policy of the Conservative Party (Forster, 2003, p. 143). 
Moreover, he was one of the most active “Maastricht rebels,” as already 
mentioned (Geddes, 2013, p. 239). The Euroscepticism of the new con-
servative leader was manifested to a great extent in his disapproval of 
Britain’s potential accession to the Eurozone (Lynch, 2012, pp. 74–88). 
He also had the idea of preventing Conservatives from taking part in the 
European Parliament elections, in order to demonstrate his negative at-
titude towards a United Europe, but none of the party members supported 
that idea (Butler, 2005, pp. 84–85).
It should be noted that Smith did not differ from other Eurosceptics, 
since he clearly and unbreakably continued the policy of Thatcher and 
his predecessor, Hague, but in a more radical form. Many members of 
Smith’s party considered him to be non-charismatic and indecisive in his 
attitude towards the EU, to which he often replied: “Do not underestimate 
the determination of a quiet man” (Wayne, 2002). Nevertheless, due to 
the lack of consolidation within the party, the Conservatives chose a new 
leader – the Eurosceptic Michael Howard in 2003 (leader of the party 
from 2003–2005).
Howard, as well as Smith, was a follower of Thatcherism in relation 
to the EU (Fisher, 2014, p. 216). What is interesting, though, is that after 
taking over the post of Tory leader, he said that the Conservatives would 
never left the European Parliament to have an impact on EU policies (But-
ler, 2005, p. 85). Howard thought that Europeans should build a flexible 
Europe where the issue of a common currency and constitution would not 
be imposed from above. Thus, the then Conservative leader demonstrated 
clear opposition to the Blair government’s European integration policy, 
which supported, notably, the constitutional process in the EU. A feature 
of Howard’s Euroscepticism was the opposition to the further expansion 
of the EU after 2004, especially having rejected the potential accession 
of Turkey (Baimbridge, Whyman, Mullen, 2016, pp. 95–97). Apart from 
this, the politician campaigned for maximum decentralization in the EU, 
greater liberalization of the activities of its institutions and the termina-
tion of Britain’s participation in the Social Charter. Howard was a radical 
Eurosceptic who also actively promoted “Brexit” in 2016, having con-
50 Omelian Tarnavskyi ŚSP 4 ’17
vinced its supporters that “beyond the borders of the EU, Britain would 
be much better,” however, without specifying the reasons for it (Howard, 
2016).
Howard was replaced, as time shows, by the more influential and am-
bitious Eurosceptic David Cameron (party leader, 2005–2016) in 2005. 
Many researchers consider him to be a faithful follower of Thatcher 
(Alexandre-Collier, 2015, pp. 1–2) although Cameron himself is not the 
supporter of such an opinion. He calls himself a “fan” of the “Iron Lady,” 
but denies belonging to the “Thatcherists” (Watts, 2012, p. 242). Never-
theless, due to his Eurosceptic position Cameron won the Tory leadership 
election (Lee, Beech, 2009, pp. 198–200). He promised to withdraw the 
Conservatives from the European Parliament parties, that Smith could not 
do, and Howard refused to do. The new leader of the Conservatives was 
opposed to the expansion of the powers of the EU’s governing bodies, 
and therefore strongly rejected the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, 
which in fact replaced the EU Constitution and established the post of 
President of the EU (the President of the European Council is sometimes 
referred to as the “President of the European Union”) and made other in-
stitutional changes. At the time when all the EU member states ratified the 
document, Cameron called it an act of betrayal by the Labour government 
in 2009 (Summers, 2009). At that time, in 2007, Gordon Brown (Prime 
Minister, 2007–2010) – an ally of Tony Blair, was heading to be elected 
leader of the Labour Party and become Prime Minister. Although Brown 
was less optimistic than his predecessor, he did not demonstrate Euro-
sceptic behavior and views. When there was a proposal from the Con-
servatives to hold a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, Brown rejected it. 
Some researchers consider this position to be “historic – when the Prime 
Minister refuses to involve British society in discussing a very important 
document” (Gardiner, McNamara, 2008).
In response to Brown’s behavior, Cameron said that if the Conserva-
tives won the next election, they would apply for an amendment to the 
Treaty on the European Union to prohibit the increase of powers of EU 
institutions without national referendums (Summers, 2009). It was not 
difficult to predict that the reluctance to hold a referendum on the Treaty 
of Lisbon would not serve Brown in the parliamentary elections in 2010. 
The Conservatives duly won the majority of votes for the first time in 
ten years, but due to the lack of seats in Parliament, they had to form 
a government led by Cameron in coalition with the Liberal Democrats. 
The Eurosceptic rhetoric of Cameron, mostly since 2009, the year before 
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parliamentary elections, was based mainly on the idea of a referendum 
on the Lisbon Treaty in the EU (Muz, 2016). He was convinced that this 
document was nothing more than an attempt by European Commission-
ers to adopt an EU Constitution in disguise, and which had failed in 2004 
(Muz, 2016).
Thus, Cameron categorically opposed the increase in the powers of 
EU bodies and the creation of new institutions such as the institution of 
President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, as envisaged by the Treaty of 
Lisbon. Exploring his public speeches, one may notice that he had a cer-
tain fear that the EU could go beyond the borders of democratic power 
and then, according to his vision, it would be too late to do anything. This 
was the reason that Cameron favored a “flexible Union” in which member 
states would respect and value national identity more, and the national 
powers of the member states would remain unchanged (Adams, Fabbrini, 
Larouche, 2014, p. 317). Having become Prime Minister, Cameron said 
that he had been sceptical about the EU because the EU had been trying to 
transform itself into a centralized management machine (Rennie, 2011). 
It is also the case that Cameron was one of the few politicians, who pub-
licly called himself “Eurosceptic” (Rennie, 2011). According to him, his 
scepticism was due to the EU developing in the wrong direction: “There 
is less growth, fewer jobs and less competitiveness” (Adams, Fabbrini, 
Larouche, 2014, p. 317).
In addition, he strongly opposed the accession of Britain to the eurozone 
and the deepening of European integration processes, which in his opinion, 
undermined the national interests of the United Kingdom. In particular, this 
was concerned with the migration problem, which was the product of mul-
ticulturalism which, in his words, created “separate communities within the 
EU that were completely counter to British values” (Race, 2015, 129). We 
can reach the conclusion that Cameron’s Euroscepticism had its roots in the 
field of national security. As far as the author of this paper is concerned, he 
considers Cameron to be a moderate Eurosceptic, because he never agitated 
for Brexit and he wanted the EU to be a “successful project” instead (Ad-
ams, Fabbrini, Larouche, 2014, p. 317). But, according to Cameron, it was 
possible only with the above conditions.
During the 2015 parliamentary elections, the Prime Minister an-
nounced his intention to hold a referendum on Britain’s membership of 
the EU by the end of 2017 (Sabin, 2015). However, it happened a bit 
earlier. The referendum was held in June 2016, in which 51.2% of voters 
voted for the UK’s exit from the EU (Bloomberg, 2016).
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Thus, Cameron succeeded in achieving the Eurosceptic wishes of 
many Conservatives who were the leaders of the government, or leaders 
of the opposition, and even some in the Labour party. Obviously, Cam-
eron became a hostage of a difficult set of circumstances in the EU related 
to the migration crisis. It is likely that under more favorable conditions 
he would not have initiated the referendum. All in all, the crisis in the 
EU and his earlier promises forced the head of government to take such 
a step.
Conclusions
The study shows that there were no systematic Proponents of Euro-
scepticism in the UK: neither among the Conservatives, nor among La-
bour party members. In general, the results of the study are ambiguous.
Firstly, if one makes a comprehensive analysis of the supporters and 
Proponents of Euroscepticism, one can notice than their majority comes 
from the Conservative Party. Among the key Eurosceptics among the 
Tories were Churchill, who initiated the line of Euroscepticism in this 
party, Anthony Eden, Margaret Thatcher, who, through her “iron” policy, 
became the ideological inspiration behind Euroscepticism, Norman Teb-
bit, John Major, Michael Portillo, John Redwood, William Hague, Iain 
Duncan Smith, Michael Howard, and finally David Cameron, who suc-
cessfully completed the joint Eurosceptic, and sometimes even anti-Euro-
peanist efforts of them all. The most influential of the Eurosceptics were 
Churchill, who created the trend for Euroscepticism, and Thatcher, who 
laid the foundations for Euroscepticism.
The Labour Party, apparently, has fewer Eurosceptics. Among them 
the most visible and influential were Clement Attlee, Herbert Morrison 
and Hugh Gaitskell. They had the greatest influence on British politics 
in the early 1950s and were ready to do anything to prevent their country 
from participating in the establishment of the ECSC and the EEC.
Secondly, despite the fact that British Eurosceptics belong to differ-
ent ideological (party) camps, their Euroscepticism, strangely enough, is 
based on the same principles: Britain is not Europe, therefore, it has no 
place in the unifying processes; the ECSC (the EU) will become an em-
pire/superstate, where all the decisions will be taken at the center; Britain 
will lose influence; membership of the EU will be the beginning of the 
end of Britain; the EU is a threat to Britain’s national security through 
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the rise of terrorism, the spread of drugs and the increase in the number 
of illegal immigrants. All British Eurosceptics were also against a feder-
ated Europe, a single currency and joint citizenship of the EU, collective 
taxation and the creation of an EU army, a joint constitution and Turkey’s 
membership of the EU and against enlargement of the EU and the powers 
of EU institutions.
Thirdly, despite the high level of Euroscepticism and the significant 
number of influential Eurosceptics and anti-Europeanists, the United 
Kingdom joined the EEC in 1973, signed the SEA in 1986 under the 
leadership of, incidentally, the Eurosceptic Thatcher, and finally, on its 
own terms, the UK became a co-founder of the modern European Union. 
However, we should not diminish the role of Eurosceptics in British poli-
tics. The above mentioned political figures affected the fact that Britain 
did not join the Schengen agreement and did not adopt the Social Chapter 
of the EU Treaty (at first). They also actively fought against the adoption 
of the EU Constitution and eventually demanded a referendum on the 
UK’s exit from the EU. The UK’s exit from the EU does not mean the 
end for British Eurosceptics. They will criticize the EU, but no longer as 
members of this Union, like before the entry of the UK into the EEC and 
EU (if Britain comes out of the EU). Therefore, the list of Eurosceptics 
will definitely extend.
Fourthly, in the course of the study, the author formed his own ty-
pology of Euroscepticism, according to which he distinguished moder-
ate (for example, Churchill, Major and Hague) and radical (for example, 
Attlee, Thatcher and Smith) Euroscepticism. The topic of the types of 
Euroscepticism is a separate issue, so the author will conduct the analysis 
in his next study.
Fifthly, the author discovered that Redwood can be considered the 
theoretician of contemporary British Euroscepticism, on account of his 
books which aim to criticize the EU, as well as due to his open Euroscep-
ticism. This statement, however, also requires further research.
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Zwolennicy eurosceptycyzmu w Wielkiej Brytanii w latach 1950–2017 
 
Streszczenie
Autor niniejszego artykułu bada kwestię obecności zwolenników eurosceptycy-
zmu w Wielkiej Brytanii w latach 1950–2017. Autor twierdzi, że pierwszym euro-
sceptycznym szefem rządu był Winston Churchill i utrzymuje, że eurosceptycyzm 
nie jest zjawiskiem powiązanym z jakąkolwiek partią polityczną, lecz zjawiskiem 
o charakterze ponadpartyjnym, nieposiadającym ścisłego związku z konkretną ide-
ologią. Jednocześnie zauważa, że największy odsetek eurosceptyków w Wielkiej 
Brytanii występuje wśród konserwatystów. W toku rozważań zawartych w artykule, 
autor identyfikuje głównego teoretyka współczesnego brytyjskiego eurosceptycyzmu, 
a także wyodrębnia umiarkowany i radykalny wariant eurosceptycyzmu.
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